

## 反对学术虚无主义

——驳李涛和邬志辉的“不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”论

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(摘要)以“可能导致的‘平庸’合法性认同”来论证“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”,在逻辑上是荒谬的。“不可断然拒绝平庸”必然助长大小“学霸”们的恶行。我们反对过分注重“形式合理性”或者“形式合法性”,但并不可以一概反对“形式合理性”或者“形式合法性”。我们应该坚决拒绝“学霸”和完全形式化的学术评价机制,而不是拒绝“断然拒绝平庸”和必要的学术形式。“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”的观点及其论说,其实是在倡导“学术虚无主义”。当下不良学术生态的形成,“学霸”和满足于学术平庸者是沆瀣一气的“共谋”。“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”的主张遗害无穷,学术界必须坚决反对“不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”的学术虚无主义。

(关键词)平庸学术;学术形式;学术生态;学霸;学术虚无主义

李涛和邬志辉在《中国哲学社会科学学风规范议题三论——问学于李醒民教授》<sup>(1)</sup>(以下简称为“李邬文”,下面引述该文时不再标注出处)一文中,以“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”反对李醒民先生的学术要“断然拒绝平庸”<sup>(2)</sup>之观点。他们的论述貌似合理,但只要仔细阅读,就会发现其潜藏的不可调和的内在逻辑矛盾。并且,在我看来,李涛和邬志辉的观点,实质上是在宣扬“学术虚无主义”。本文旨在针对这一学术问题提出自己的批评意见。

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李涛和邬志辉说:“笔者在一般理论层面上同意李醒民所提出的学术祛平

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庸化思想,但对于其断然拒绝平庸思路背后所可能导致的‘平庸’合法性认同予以担心,在此意义上,笔者反而认为学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’。”

笔者实在愚钝,我实在不明白,“断然拒绝平庸思路背后所可能导致的‘平庸’合法性认同”是什么意思。作为语言学、语言哲学和科学哲学学者,我实在无法对此作出“直接”理解。我只能从语法和逻辑层面(或者角度)“猜度”这一论断的意思:(1)李涛和邬志辉似乎是在说,李醒民先生的“断然拒绝平庸”之“思路”“可能导致”对于学术“平庸”之“合法性认同”;甚或,(2)李涛和邬志辉似乎是在说,李醒民先生的“断然拒绝平庸”“思路”“背后”其实潜藏着“导致”对学术“平庸”之“合法性认同”的企图,或者李先生的用意其实是在鼓励学术“平庸”;(3)作为有良知的学人,李涛和邬志辉“担心”“断然拒绝平庸思路”会“导致”对学术的“‘平庸’合法性认同”。

如果是第一种意思,既然“断然拒绝平庸”怎么就“可能导致”对于学术“平庸”之“合法性认同”呢?这是两个完全对立的“思路”,这两个“思路”在逻辑上并没有必然的因果关系。因为,之所以“断然拒绝平庸”,首先就在于否弃了学术“平庸”之“合法性”,其本身是一种良知<sup>(3)</sup>抉择,正因为“断然拒绝平庸思路背后”不认同学术“平庸”的“合法性”才做出了“断然拒绝平庸”之抉择。

在当下的学术共同体实践中,的确存在(甚至是泛滥地存在)容纳甚至鼓励学术平庸之作的现象。这种给予学术平庸之作以“合法性”“外衣”的行为,在一定意义上是一种对“‘平庸’合法性”的“认同”(更确切地说是一种“合法性”“许可”),但这并不能说明(或者证明)“断然拒绝平庸”(作为“前因”)与对于学术“平庸”之“合法性认同”(作为“后果”)在学术共同体实践上具有必然的因果关系。因为正是出于牟取单位或者个人私利而“认同”(更确切地说是“认可”)学术平庸之作的“合法性”(作为“前因”),才“容纳”、“接纳”学术平庸之作的(作为“后果”),才导致了学术平庸之作泛滥的。也就是说,认可学术平庸之作的“合法性”是“因”,而“容纳”、“接纳”学术平庸之作是“果”;如果套用李涛和邬志辉言说范式,对“‘平庸’合法性”的“认同”是“因”,而“不可断然拒绝平庸”是“果”。正是由于把持学术机构的大小“学霸”们“合法性”许可(或者如他们所说的“‘平庸’合法性认同”)的恶行导致了学术平庸之作的泛滥。显然,李涛和邬志辉是将“因果关系”颠倒了,他们的推论方式在逻辑上是荒谬的。“不可断然拒绝平庸”必然助长大小“学霸”们的恶行。

仔细研读“李邬文”就会发现,尽管李涛和邬志辉的论断在形式上是一个“可能”的或然性因果关系的逻辑判断,但从论述笔调看,他们显然是将这一判断或论断当作一个必然因果关系的全称判断的逻辑论断来论证的。

在论证此论断之观点时,他们第一个使用的论据就是一个必然因果关系的全称判断的逻辑论断,他们认为,“断然拒绝平庸思路”会导致“以‘平庸’之名扼杀哲学社会科学领域内的学术批判与范式革命”(姑且称之为第一个“一级论据”)。尽管这是一个“或然性”逻辑因果关系的非全称判断——而且从他们对

这一论断的论证过程看也是如此,但李涛和邬志辉在话语言说方式上给出的却是一个必然因果关系的全称判断的逻辑论断,因为他们并没有对“以‘平庸’之名扼杀哲学社会科学领域内的学术批判与范式革命”作任何的逻辑限制。

他们支持这一判断(即前面引述的第一个“一级论据”)的理由是,在面对或者深陷“老人学术风格”“学院派所绝对把持的学科专业化学术评价”时,“在形式合法性的学科专业化学术评价面前”,青年学者们“难免遭遇以‘平庸’口实而恶意扼杀或阉割的尴尬命运。”(姑且称之为“二级论据”)然而,从中国学术机构的现实看,学无建树、刚愎自用的学霸的确存在——李醒民先生就曾遭遇过,但即使现实中存在“老人学术风格”(我并不认同这种说法,下面将述及这方面的话题)的话,它也不会成为主流,如今50岁左右甚至40岁左右的中青年学者已经占据了大部分的学术领导和行政领导岗位,自然科学和技术学术研究机构是如此,哲学社会人文学术研究机构也是如此,既然如此,何来“老人学术风格”“学院派所绝对把持的学科专业化学术评价”呢?而且,李涛和邬志辉俨然将“老人学术风格”等同于“学霸做派”或者“学霸作风”了。在我看来,“学霸”是不能用年龄或者资历来衡量的;从如今中国学术界掌握实权者年龄构成上看,学霸主要是“年富力强”的学霸,并不是“老人”学霸。显然,这个或然性的并不成立的二级论据并不支持前面引述的必然因果关系的全称判断的逻辑论断(即第一个“一级论据”)。“断然拒绝平庸思路”会导致“以‘平庸’之名扼杀哲学社会科学领域内的学术批判与范式革命”之论断在逻辑上是无法成立的,进而,它也就不能成为“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”的理由。

李涛和邬志辉一方面说:“哲学社会科学禀赋的自由性格要求中国学人不仅仅要‘反思’命题,更重要的是‘否思’命题和‘重建’命题,‘否思’和‘重建’命题注定是以激进的批判学术为根基并在此基础上重新直面问题本身,这与中国几千年以来被历史形塑的人文学术风格明显迥异。”一方面又“驳‘学术断然拒绝平庸’论”,实在让人匪夷所思。既然想要“‘否思’和‘重建’命题”之革命性的学术作品,为什么又要反对“学术断然拒绝平庸”呢?在我看来,其实质并不在于想要“‘否思’和‘重建’命题”之学术研究、学术作品,其实是在为平庸的、自说自话的、缺乏严密论证的“平庸”之作品及其作者辩护,甚或是在为学无专攻、不学无术甚至投机钻营的“青年学者们”辩护。

我完全同意李涛和邬志辉的这个观点:“对任何哲学社会科学问题的绝对引经据典化在故意屏蔽自我的同时也完全阻碍了中国学术思想的意义再造与理论原创,然这些与传统学术风格互接的当代中国学术又进一步地制度化形塑了与此相互认同与激励的学术评价,由学界既得利益者所共同确认的这些具有形式合理性的学科专业化学术评价越来越窒息以‘否思’为根本的激进批判学术的生存”。但是,这种观点并不能成为否定“断然拒绝平庸”,进而采取鼓励(起码是默许)“平庸”之作大行其道的理由。只要是以“否思”为起点的严密论证的“‘重建’命题”,必定是创新性的观点或者理论,都不会是平庸之作,既然要以

“否思”和“重建”作为学术研究的基调或者根基,为何又要反对“断然拒绝平庸”呢?在逻辑上,对于上述引文而言,“断然拒绝平庸”才是合理的结论。只不过,如果仅仅是“否思”的甚或仅仅是为了“否思”而“否思”,为了反对而反对,为了否定前人而凸现自己,严重缺乏必要的逻辑论证就提出所谓“‘重建’命题”这种情形下成为“真知灼见”的可能性是有的,历史和现实中也有个案,但这在概率统计上是个极低极低的比例,所谓“‘重建’命题”的观点或者理论大多只可能是“平庸”之作。也许,只是为了“平庸”而为“平庸”的合理性提出辩护,并不是想真正作出具有创新性的作品,才是李涛和邬志辉的本意。

如果李涛和邬志辉说的是第二种意思,其着笔上的吊诡就非常耐人寻味了。“李邬文”的笔调着实吊诡,既“诗性”地直接陈述着十分明白的观点,又以藏而不露、匿而不宣的笔调隐喻着什么,暗示着什么,影射着什么。他们基于“老人学术风格”必然压制、排斥青年学者的“否思”和“重建”命题之学术努力为基本逻辑理路,以虽然没有明言但却以暗指(或者上下文印证的方式)将“老人学术风格”等同于“学霸”做派或者“学霸”作风,并以此来论证所谓的“断然拒绝平庸思路背后所可能导致的‘平庸’合法性认同”这种叙说是非常诡谲的。

从语篇语境的角度来分析,“李邬文”潜藏的语义是:主张“断然拒绝平庸”的思路背后潜藏着主张者对学术“‘平庸’合法性”的“认同”,并且企图以“平庸”口实来恶意扼杀或阉割青年学者“否思”和“重建”命题的学术努力,如此看来问题就严重了,由此就会得出这样的结论:李醒民先生是道貌岸然的“老人学术风格”的学霸!真是岂有此理!

学术界的人大多知道,李先生曾是被“学霸”排斥、凌辱的对象,同时也是与“学霸”斗争的勇敢斗士!学术界的人也大多知道,李醒民先生是当今中国学术界反对学术腐败、反对学术失范的一面旗帜,是倡导和践行学术自由、学术争鸣、学术创新的旗手。无疑,《自然辩证法通讯》“为开创我国学术自由的局面所作的贡献,是有目共睹的。”<sup>(4)</sup>在李醒民先生担任《自然辩证法通讯》主编期间,他继承、发扬和光大了于光远等学术前辈奠定的优良学术风范,在办刊过程中坚持“不论职位高低,不问名气大小,不管关系亲疏,不计人情厚薄,不图感谢回报,不齿献金送礼,唯质是视,量质录用”,坚持“广纳四海学术翘楚,化育中国思想嚆矢”,坚持做“学术争鸣的促进者,思想创造的光大者,精神家园的守望者,心灵自由的呵护者。”<sup>(5)</sup>他与《自然辩证法通讯》编辑部成员们是这样说的,也是这样做的!由此可见,不切实际、不合事实的含沙射影的“诗性”发作,只能说是一种带有人身攻击意味、恣意妄为、不负责任的非学术行为。

李涛和邬志辉从前述立场或者错误评判出发,“诗性”地随意猜度所谓“断然拒绝平庸思路背后”的对学术“‘平庸’合法性”的“认同”,是与李醒民先生的学术风范、学术“做派”事实严重不符的,是将“帽子”戴错了对象!以这种方式来反对“断然拒绝平庸”,以此来宣扬和推崇“不可断然拒绝平庸”显然是行不通的,学术界绝大多数同仁是会断然拒绝的!

如果李涛和邬志辉说的是第三种意思,即如果他们是作为有良知的学人在“担心”“断然拒绝平庸思路”会“导致”对学术的“‘平庸’合法性认同”,尽管二者之间并不存在必然因果关系,甚至没有丝毫的可能的因果关系,这也无可厚非,人们也可以十分勉强地给予理解或者同情——尽管这样做使人十分为难。但总体上看,这种“担心”实在是几乎不着边际甚至根本不着边际的“杞人忧天”。这种“担心”的依据似乎是“单一积累型的老人学术风格”过分看重形式上的“绝对引经据典的他者言说方式”,显然他们的这种“担心”是多余的。

问题是,李涛和邬志辉并不仅仅是在“担心”,他们试图论证的是“断然拒绝平庸思路”与对学术的“‘平庸’合法性认同”的必然因果关系,试图论证的是“断然拒绝平庸思路”必然“导致”对学术的“‘平庸’合法性认同”。

我基本同意李涛和邬志辉的说法:“以绝对引经据典的他者言说方式体现出对某一哲学社会科学问题貌似渊博的深度解答,但这些所谓的深度解答或许并不如一个敢于直面问题本身且具有敏锐洞察力而并不刻意引经据典且采用主体性言说方式而诠释问题的青年学者说的深刻”,但如果第一句话加上“越老的学者越能”如何,说“事实上,只会是越老的学者越能以绝对引经据典的他者言说方式体现出对某一哲学社会科学问题貌似渊博的深度解答”,这就让人难以苟同了。因为,事实上,从哲学社会人文学科领域学术史的角度看,在一个学者的成长过程中,像青年维特根斯坦那样极少引用、而是以自己独特的逻辑论述方式进行论说,而且得到罗素这样伟大哲学家赏识的年轻才俊少之又少,绝大部分年轻学者都是从严格地引述与严密地论证开始自己最初和早期的学术生涯的;从哲学社会人文学科大师们的学术成长历程看,越是学术积累到一定厚度、越是年长的时候,学术论说愈加“自我”,愈加具有自己的个性和创造性。至于横跨或者游走于多个行当(诸如学术与行政通吃)的学者当中,的确存在尽管自己在学术上毫无建树却对别人横加指责、极力排斥的“学霸”,但这些人学者心目中根本算不上是“学术权威”,甚至根本不把他们当作“学者”。我非常认同国际中国哲学会(ISCP)一位会员的看法:“在历史和现实中,一些权威学者所制造的妨碍精神创造和思想进步的丑陋行径已屡见不鲜。有些学术权威显然就是学霸。那些学霸自以为是、固步自封,在思想上阻止进步、在学术上遏制创新,他(或者他们)压制后学、拒绝批评与修正;在受其影响的学者群体中造成了在思想上理性批判精神颓废、阿谀奉承盛行的不良后果。这是学术的不幸,学人的不幸;从人类思想史的角度讲,更是人类的不幸。”<sup>(6)</sup> 我们也曾指出:“一些崇洋迷外、毫无思想建树,却又自负自恋、学风霸道的学者,已经成为中国哲学思想创新或者哲学思想复兴的绊脚石!”<sup>(7)</sup> 但是,如果以偏概全地以“学霸”们的做法来诠释所谓的“老人学术风格”,既是对学有所长、对人类思想发展做出重要贡献的圣贤和先辈大师的亵渎,在文化传承和学术传承的意义上更是站不住脚的!于情于理都让人难以接受!在我看来,真正学有所长、术有成就的大师们是不会压制和排斥后学的。我亲身感受到的科学技术哲学(或者自然辩证法)研究领域

范岱年、金吾伦等学术大家的风范个案,足以在逻辑上推翻李涛和邬志辉关于所谓的“老人学术风格”的论断,我从来没有看到像范先生、金先生这样的大师做出过“以‘平庸’口实而恶意扼杀或阉割”“新学术”的行为。而且,尽管我还未到“老年”,尚属中青年学者,对于那些貌似学术的胡编乱造的所谓“新学术”,我也会毫不留情地排斥甚至拒斥的。

我非常理解李涛和邬志辉对学术界一些人过分注重“形式合理性”或者“形式合法性”的不满情绪,我对过分注重“形式合理性”或者“形式合法性”也持坚定的反对态度。我之所以“跳出”外语学术圈来搞“非外语类”的学术,就是因为我实在无法接受“外语圈”内通行的“照着讲”、“接着说”的学术“范式”,就是因为我实在无法苟同和忍受这个“学术圈”内审稿(或者评判学术论文水平)以参考文献是否有外文文献、是否是依据外文文献说法展开论述为取舍标准的“崇洋媚外”的“爬行主义”做法,因为他们的依据是:中国人是不可能搞出(或者创造出)超出外国人学术水平的东西的。这个圈内的学霸动辄就以“形式合理性”或者“形式合法性”的东西来拒绝他人具有一定创建的学术成果。尽管如此,我认为,没有形式的内容是不存在的,这似乎是个“自明性”真理。

我们反对过分注重“形式合理性”或者“形式合法性”,但并不可以一概反对“形式合理性”或者“形式合法性”。如果“学术成果”缺乏一定的、必要的“形式合理性”或者“形式合法性”,缺乏一定的、必要的逻辑论证,论点缺乏具有因果关系的论据支持,只是“自说自话”、完全“自我”地做出“诗性”抒发,这种学术成果遭遇学术同行的拒斥就是在所难免的了。在这种情形下,学术同行的拒斥并不能算作是对“新学术”的“恶意扼杀或阉割”,因为这种“新学术”是存在严重瑕疵的,在学术上是存在严重缺陷的;即使是真正具有“独创性”的观点,在未加论证、未加证实的情形下,这种“新学术”还只能算是个不成形的“观点”或“理论”,甚至还不能被算作是“学术成果”,充其量是个“猜想”。因此,以突出内容一概反对形式,借反对过分注重“形式合理性”或者“形式合法性”之名来为“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”辩护是行不通的。后面我还将进一步谈到我对学术形式的看法。

在我看来,“断然拒绝平庸”,对于每个学者而言,是个必须选择而且尽可能践行的伦理准则;对于学术界而言,是个必须追求而且尽可能以不断完善学术规范和学术评价体系去努力接近的理想境界。

我认为,作为学者,如果不“断然拒绝平庸”就必然会沦为学术平庸者,甚至沦为平庸学术泛滥的“共谋”,沦为助长平庸学术泛滥的推波助澜者。

李涛和邬志辉一方面“在一般理论层面上同意李醒民所提出的学术祛平庸化思想”,但又“反而认为学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’。”这种“在一般理论层面上同意”,在实践层面上拒斥的诡谲或者吊诡的学术态度,着实让人莫名其妙。显然,无论是在逻辑理性的意义上,还是在理论理性的意义上,这种在理论上“同意”与在实践上拒斥之间存在着不可调和的矛盾。在实践理性的意义上,固然

(任何的)理想与现实之间都存在着必然性的矛盾、冲突和张力,但并不能因为现实与理想不符,或者现实一时(或者短期内甚至永远不可能)达到理想状态,就迁就甚至鼓励现实中的不合理现象。按照李涛和邬志辉的逻辑,既然杀人放火不可避免,就不可断然拒绝杀人放火。这显然是个鼓励藏污纳垢的荒唐逻辑。

## 二

对于“拒绝平庸”是否就能使得学界没有了“平庸”之作,我同意李邬的观点,“拒绝平庸”之作并不能使学术界就没有了“平庸”之作。但是我们不能以此理由来“接纳”甚至“欢迎”平庸的“学术”作品。

在一定程度上我认可李涛和邬志辉的看法,任何学术作品都不是“平庸”之作是不可能的。一方面,对于作者来说,可能自己真诚地认为自己的作品是具有“创新”之处的——尽管学术水平的高低或者是否“平庸”还得“学术同行”或者“历史”说了算,个中歧见也算是正常的;另一方面,在以“量”来衡量学术水平,并以此来获得学术职位的“扭曲”的专业技术职务评定机制下,一些人为了“生存”或者“名声”粗制滥造、拼凑所谓“论文”是很难避免的,而一些所谓的“学术刊物”或者“认钱”不认“货”,或者“认人”(学术名声)不认“货”,甚至根本不“识货”,学术界将长期充斥低制滥造之“学术刊物”和“平庸”之作。

我也基本同意李涛和邬志辉的这一说法:“平庸可能事实上存有完全不同的真相:一是真平庸,说明该学者的功力和资质欠佳;而另一方面则是假平庸,相反,该学术可能成为真正的经典,而现有学科专业化学术评价正是其学术创造超越了的旧有范式的天然附属物”。对于前者,学术大家在论文发表、成果评价、项目评审时给予排斥态度,是非常正常的符合学术伦理道德基本底线的合理做法,如果就像当下有些行政官员把持的以关系亲疏、地位高低、礼物金钱来决定取舍的学术刊物、科研成果奖励和项目评审,一味地容忍甚至接纳、鼓励“真平庸”,排斥“真创造”、“真创新”,那就是对“真创造”、“真创新”的亵渎,是对国家资源、国家权力的滥用,这显然属于失职、渎职行为,不但要给予谴责,而且要给予必要的行政处分甚至法律处罚。

我们必须看到,“假平庸”之“超越了”“现有学科专业化学术评价”“旧有范式”的真正具有“创造性”、“创新性”的学术研究是不会被“学霸”的恶性埋没的,因为并非所有的学术机构都是被纯粹的行政官员或者“学霸”所把持,此“门”不通还有彼“门”,此“路”不通还有彼“路”,潜心学术研究的人应该相信:是金子总会发光的。因此,对于有“真创造”、“真创新”的“假平庸”之学术研究,现有的学科专业化范式并不会更不可能完全地、长期地将之拒之门外,相反,会在真正拥有学术水平的学术大家那里得到应有的提携和奖掖。

李涛和邬志辉也认为:“假平庸,对于当事学者来讲则是庆幸的,因为真正好的学术不是能够‘被平庸’的,它定会在人类历史长河中逐渐泛起美妙风暴,该学者也定会由此成为真正经得起历史考验的大师人物,当然真正的学者从不

会刻意计较生前身后名,自然他们也更懂得藐视当世的之于他的各式舆论,从而真正走入更加开放的哲学社会科学自由之境,进而创造出更大的学术成果,以造福人类。”既然如此,为何还要说“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”呢?在这方面,仅以从熊庆来“发现”和提携华罗庚,从华罗庚“发现”和提携陈景润的这种连续性的经典案例,就可以“断然”判定:所谓的“新的超越了旧有学科范式的新学术”“会被以‘平庸’之名所扼杀”的全称判断在逻辑上是不成立的。

在李涛和邬志辉看来,“中国哲学社会科学界的诸位学者,要敢于接受“平庸”的成果定性,因为来自“平庸”的两个方面真相对于普通学者而论,都是可贵的,真平庸所揭示的功力与资质欠佳将激励当事学者要更加刻苦、敏锐、深刻地去思考和研究问题,终究一天能够走出真平庸,走向学术精彩”。“真平庸”“是可贵的”,不知这是在鼓励“真平庸”,还是在安慰“真平庸”,让人丈二和尚摸不着头脑。如果是在鼓励“真平庸”,那在逻辑上就与“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”相契合了!如果是在安慰“真平庸”,这倒是还可以或多或少地给予理解和同情的,因为毕竟是在“同情弱者”嘛!只是问题在于,在同情“弱者”与坚守学术信念之间没有可以“苟合”的缝隙、节点和路途,同情学术上的“弱者”、试图以“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”来救济“弱者”,是无济于事的,与其以此方式来安慰“弱者”安于现状、安于“平庸”,不如真诚地“棒喝”、“提醒”“弱者”超越“平庸”。也许后者对于学术上的“弱者”更加实际一点,更加负责任一点,更加人性化一点。

### 三

虽然李涛和邬志辉没有使用“教条主义”一词来刻画所谓的“单一积累型的老人学术风格”,但显然他们将引用和借鉴学界前贤和当代同行的学术观点(或者材料),以学界前贤和当代同行的学术观点(或者材料)来印证自己的学术观点,当作成了“教条主义”,这显然是荒谬的!学(术)界以及学术若无规范,学术若只是“自说自话”,自然也就没有“学(术)界”和“学术”,即使有所谓的“学(术)界”和“学术”也只能是“荒漠化”的“学(术)界”和“学术”。

学术界既要反对学术上的“教条主义”,也要反对学术上的“虚无主义”。在这方面,我完全赞同赵敦化先生的观点。赵先生在谈到中国哲学界的学术状况时曾指出:有些学者“研究某个历史上的哲学家,就俨然是这个哲学家的‘二世’;懂了一点希腊哲学,就言必称希腊;看了几本现代西方哲学的书,就张口胡(塞尔)说,闭口海(德格尔)讲。哲学中教条主义的实质是定思想于一尊,离开了权威就不会说话。”“对历史上的中外哲学家(包括20世纪初的中国哲学家),基本上还只是‘照着讲’,而不是‘接着讲’。我国现在的学术出版物以不亚于经济增长率的速度快速增长,在数量上大概已经达到了世界先进指标。但是,中国学者的学术研究成果很少有国际影响,国际学术界公认的突破性的创新成果更是微乎其微。大多数研究‘成果’是闭门造车,自说自话;很多‘成果’只是简单



重复,文风浮躁甚至发展到抄袭成风的地步。”<sup>(8)</sup>

在当下中国,仅仅以作者名号取舍论文、仅仅以形式上的引用、转载、摘录来评价学术等学术“恶风”的确存在,并且非常非常严重,绝大多数所谓的“某某大学学报”等“学术刊物”和各级各种评价就是这样操作的。在我看来,如此貌似学术、貌似合理的“恶风”将长期存在下去,我对中国哲学社会人文学科领域的学术生态前途总体上持悲观态度,尽管我是一些学风端正的学术刊物、科研项目评审机构的受益者。<sup>(9)</sup>

在我看来,完全“形式化”的学术评价机制本身就是既不合法更不合理的。因为,或者之所“依据”的东西本身就是既不合法更不合理的东西——有些文摘报刊的转载或者摘录的选取者并不具有必要的学术修养和学术研究水平,或者之借以获得学术上“合法性”和“合理性”的东西本身并不具有完全意义上的学术性——例如《新华文摘》所摘取的是以大众化读者为对象的文章并不摘取需要有深厚学术基础才能读懂的学术论文。而且,在普遍存在的高水平学术研究成果认可后滞性——例如爱因斯坦 1905 年的研究成果到了 1919 年才得到普遍认可,“转载”和“摘录”很难对一些真正具有学术水平的研究成果作出反应。事实上,“转载”和“摘录”往往是大量地“容纳”了“平庸”之作。

“形式化”的学术评价机制本身既非法更不合理还在于,在学术不端行为盛行、学术生态“非常悲哀和诡谲”的当下,仅以“被引用”的数量来评价论文的学术水平也是很成问题的。一方面,普遍存在的高水平学术研究成果认可后滞性,引用并不能及时体现一些论文的学术价值;另一方面,在“抄袭”盛行的当下,本来是照搬了别人的观点,明明是照抄了别人的论说,却不标注出处,这种“被不引用”的数量是惊人的,因此有关机构所统计的“引用”数量并不能反映“被引用”的真实情况。

因此,我在有限程度上赞同李涛和邬志辉反对“形式合法性的学科专业化学术评价”的态度,但我不赞同他们一概反对任何文章结构形式要求、完全放任作者“诗性”地构造文章的主张,我更加反对的是完全以数理统计的专业化的形式数据来评价学术水平的做法。我们要给予思想以完全彻底的自由,但万不可以给予行为以完全彻底的自由,如果那样,上帝也可能成为恶魔。

我们应该坚决拒绝“学霸”和完全形式化的学术评价机制,而不是拒绝“断然拒绝平庸”和必要的学术形式。

#### 四

在我看来,李涛和邬志辉“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”的观点及其论说,其实是在倡导“学术虚无主义”。对于国内当下哲学社会人文学科领域已经非常悲哀和诡谲又非常荒谬和荒凉的学术生态而言,他们的言论是非常有害的,此种“学术平庸”以及他还主张的“学术无中心”、“祛导向”的“学术虚无主义”之风若涨,势必加剧国内哲学社会人文学科领域已经泛滥成灾的“粗制滥造”之风,

势必加剧国内哲学社会人文学科领域已经泛滥成灾的抄袭拼凑之风,势必加剧已经腐坏的学风。

从“劣币驱逐良币”的原理看,“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”其实就几乎等于是“学术断然拒绝‘创新’”,无创新的学术显然是没有学术价值和学术意义的。而且,从李涛和邬志辉的论说方式上看,他们所论说的“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”应改为“学术断然不可拒绝‘平庸’”,若为后者,那就不是“劣币驱逐良币”,而是直接摒弃“良币”了。中国当下的学术不轨、平庸学术泛滥都是不良学术生态惹得祸;而当下不良学术生态的形成,“学霸”和满足于学术平庸者是沆瀣一气的“共谋”。因此,无论是“学术不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”还是“学术断然不可拒绝‘平庸’”的主张都是遗害无穷的!学术界必须坚决反对“不可断然拒绝‘平庸’”的学术虚无主义。

最后,在我看来,《中国哲学社会科学学风规范议题三论——问学于李醒民教授》一本身本身就是缺乏学术史常识、缺乏学术共同体(抑或科学共同体)机制基本知识、缺乏学术伦理(或者科学伦理)基本知识、缺乏语篇连贯性和逻辑一致性的平庸之作,尽管该文给出了“耸人听闻”的观点,给出了让制造“平庸”之作品作者“喜闻乐见”的说法。

#### 注释:

(1) 李涛、邬志辉:《中国哲学社会科学学风规范议题三论——问学于李醒民教授》,《学术界》2012年第1期,第109-117页。

(2) 李醒民:《学术断然拒绝平庸》,《自然辩证法通讯》2010年第4期,第105-106页。

(3) 《辞源》“良知”词条说:良知“是天赋的分辨是非善恶的智能”;西方人的“良知”“意味一种内心的认知动因的存在,这个动因使得个人能够达到道德的和伦理的真,并且能够判断道德事态。”

(4) 许良英:《反对组织对所谓“物理学研究中的唯心论”的大批判》,《自然辩证法通讯》1993年第6期,第73-75页。

(5) 李醒民:《〈自然辩证法通讯〉的定位、旨趣、追求和格调》,《自然辩证法通讯》2008年第3期,第98-99页。

(6) 韩斌全:《论学术权威的有限合理性和对学霸的拒斥——基于学术界谋求思想解放和学术进步的诉求看》,《自然辩证法通讯》2009年第2期,第102-104页。

(7) 韩彩英、李春涛:《论学派意识与学术生态现实——从国内哲学界学派的境遇及地方高校学科建设的路径抉择看》,《晋阳学刊》2012年第1期,第57-65页。

(8) 赵敦华:《中国哲学现代形态的时间轨迹》,《学术研究》2008年第11期,第10-14页。

(9) 例如,我在《语言文字应用》、《学术界》、《晋阳学刊》、《科学学》和《自然辩证法通讯》等学术刊物投稿,这些刊物并没有因为我的学术地位卑微更没有“官帽”而完全拒之门外——尽管我自认为学术水平还可以的一些论文没有被采用。

(责任编辑:钟和)

Appropriate conflict for Collective Intelligence is of positive significance , in order to make the process of group decision out of the group thinking limitation. It must make reasonable conflict in groups.

The best way to arrange “outsider” or “Challenger” can ensure the group decision making in clear thinking ,to prevent the “irrational” decision – making process.

#### 7. The rationality of collective

“Bandwagon effect” and the group decision making process of irrational behavior is a small group of bias in the direct incentives ,the incentives to a large extent to the role of the group “newcomer”.

### IV. Conclusion

The development history of Collective Intelligence is as long as that of human society. The group is not only a motley crew ,but also has its own story decision action and risk avoidance logic. Under certain conditions ,group will have wisdom ,and that will help promote the benign operation of post – modern society coordination and development.

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- (3) Dai Ruwei. Man – computer cooperative intelligent science. Beijing: Institute of Automation ,CAS 2006.
- (4) Chen Zhe. Violence of internetgroups age in China. Knowledge Economy 2009 6 pp. 69 – 70.

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## Objection to Academic Nihilism —— Rejecting Li Tao and Wu Zhihui’ s Assertion That Academic Research Should Not Reject Commonplace

In their paper Three Arguments on Academic Atmosphere for Chinese Philosophy & Social Science —— Debate with Professor Li Xingmin ,Li Tao and Wu Zhihui object to Professor Li Xingmin’ s claim that academic research must reject commonplace ,asserting otherwise. The seemingly reasonable argumentations of theirs are in fact logically contradictory. What’ s worse is that they are in essence advocating academic nihilism.

Li and Wu say that “Theoretically the authors agree with Li Xingmin’ s idea that academic research must reject commonplace ,but worry that his idea

may probably lead to our identification with the legitimacy of commonplace , and in this very sense ,the authors think that academic research should not reject commonplace altogether. ”

This claim of theirs probably means: 1. The proposal to reject commonplace may lead to our very identification with the legitimacy of the academic commonplace; 2. Behind the proposal to reject commonplace lurks the advocator’s attempt to identify with the legitimacy of academic commonplace; 3. Li and Wu worry that the proposal to reject commonplace may in fact lead to the identification with the legitimacy of academic commonplace. Let me refute the above – stated three points one by one.

How can “rejecting commonplace flatly” lead to the “identification with the legitimacy of the academic commonplace”? The former and the latter are two totally opposite ideas and there is no necessary causal relationship between them at all. “Rejecting commonplace flatly” denies the legitimacy of academic commonplace so it is itself a choice out of good sense.

By carefully reading their paper ,one would find though their assertion is in form a logical judgment of contingent causality ,they carry out their demonstration ,taking the judgment as a universal one.

In carrying out their demonstration ,the first argument they use is a universal logical judgment of positive causal relationship. They think that the idea of “rejecting commonplace flatly” will lead to the strangling of academic critique and paradigm revolution in the area of philosophy and social sciences in the excuse of their being common. Obviously this is a non – universal judgment of contingent causality ,but Li and Wu take it as a universal judgment of necessary causality in their demonstration.

The reason why they come to the conclusion is that when young scholars meet with academic gerontocracy ,it is likely for their academic ideas to be strangled or distorted in the excuse that they are not creative but rather just common. From the age of those in power in the academic circle of China , however ,we can see that the academic lords are mainly those who are in the prime of their lives. Obviously this contingent untenable sub – argument cannot support the above stated universal logical judgment of necessary causality and naturally ,it cannot support the idea that academic research should not reject commonplace altogether.

It is really fantastic that Li and Wu say “The character endowed by philosophy and social sciences to seek freedom require that the Chinese should not only rethink of propositions but also think critically of and reconstruct propositions” ,but meanwhile refute the assertion that academic research must reject commonplace flatly. Why at once wanting to have innovative academic works from critically thinking of and reconstructing propositions and doing the above – stated thing? In my view ,they are defending for those ( young) scholars ” who lack in both learning and practical ability ,are not

proficient in anything and even serve their personal interests through trickery.

If they take the second kind of understanding, they are very paradoxical in tone. On the logic that the academic style of the old man will necessarily exclude and suppress the effort of young scholars to think critically of and reconstruct propositions, they imply that the academic style of the old man equals the style of academic lords, and thereby they argue the claim that academic research must reject commonplace flatly may result in the very identification with the legitimacy of commonplace. Their narration is quite paradoxical.

What's hidden in Li and Wu's writing is that behind the claim that academic research must reject commonplace flatly lurks the advocator's identification with the legitimacy of academic commonplace and that in fact he attempts to strangle young scholars' effort to think critically of and reconstruct proposition in the excuse that it is just common. From their argumentation necessarily comes the conclusion that Mr. Li Xingmin is a seemingly respectable academic lord with the academic style of the old man.

In the Chinese academic circle, Mr. Li Xingmin is a flag bearer who objects to academic corruption and academic misconduct and who advocates and practices academic freedom, academic debate and academic innovation. Starting from the above – stated misjudgment, Li and Wu “poetically” infer the so – called identification with the legitimacy of academic commonplace resulted from the claim that commonplace must be rejected flatly. What they do is in severe contrast to Mr. Li Xingmin's scholarly style. It is obviously unworkable to object to rejecting commonplace flatly and advocate otherwise.

If they take the third kind of understanding, namely, Li and Wu worry that the proposal to reject commonplace may in fact lead to the identification with the legitimacy of the academic commonplace, then it is really unnecessary for them to do so.

But they don't “worry” about it. What they do want is to demonstrate the necessary causality between the idea of rejecting commonplace flatly and the identification with the legitimacy of academic commonplace.

They say that “In fact, the older the scholar is, the more able he will be to give seemingly profound answers to a certain question in the area of philosophy and social sciences in an allusive speaking style of the Other.” This is hard to agree with: From the academic development process of masters in the area of philosophy and social sciences we know that the older the scholar is and the more academically accumulated, the more academically characteristic and innovative he will be. What Li and Wu say doesn't hold water either in logic or in fact.

I quite understand Li and Wu's dissatisfaction with some people's over-emphasis on the reasonableness or the legitimacy of the form. I myself also object firmly to this emphasis. But there is no such a thing as content without form. It seems that this is a self – evident truth. So it doesn't work to justify

the idea that academic commonplace should not be rejected flatly in the excuse to emphasize the content and object to the overemphasis on the reasonableness or the legitimacy of the form.

The idea that academic research must reject commonplace flatly is an ethical code that scholars must keep to. If they don't reject academic commonplace, scholars will inevitably fall into the common category and even become the conspirators to promote the overflow of common learning.

On the one hand Li and Wu agree in theory with Li Xingmin's idea that academic research must reject commonplace absolutely, but on the other hand they think it should not be rejected altogether. There is irreconcilable contradiction between this agreement in theory and rejection in practice. On their logic, since murder and arson cannot be avoided, then we are not to reject them flatly. This is obviously an absurd logic which encourages the carrying out of evil practices.

I agree to Li and Wu that we cannot eradicate common works by rejecting them, but we cannot thereby accept and even welcome them. And to a certain extent I agree to them that it is impossible for all works not to be common. By and large I think they are right in thinking that there are two kinds of academic commonplace: the real one and the false one. It is quite normal and reasonable for great academic masters to reject the former.

We must see that in the long run, it is not likely for really creative academic studies to be maliciously submerged by the academic lord. On the contrary they are to be encouraged by the real academic master. Li and Wu think too, really good academic researches are not to be thought of as common. Then why would they say academic commonplace should not be rejected altogether? In this respect, from the series of classic cases that Xiong Qinglai "discovered" and nurtured Hua Luogeng and Hua Luogeng did the same thing to Chen Jingrun, we can absolutely determine that such universal judgment as "New academic researches that have exceeded the old disciplinary paradigm will be strangled in the excuse that they are just common" doesn't hold water in logic.

In Li and Wu's view, scholars from the area of philosophy and social sciences of China should dare to accept the evaluation of being common because two aspects of truth from being common are precious for ordinary scholars. Hence the conclusion that being really common is precious. Do they mean to encourage or comfort being really common? If they mean the former, then it conforms to their assertion that academic commonplace should not be rejected altogether. If, out of pity for the weak, they mean the latter, then it's useless. Instead of comforting the weak in this way, we should give them a severe blow to remind them to exceed being common. The second way is perhaps more humanistic.

Though Li and Wu didn't use the word "dogmatism" to describe the so

– called simply accumulative academic style of the old man ,they obviously take the practice of quoting and referring to those of the same trade in the past and present as dogmatism. How absurd! Monologue makes up ,if any , desertified learning and desertified academic circle.

Both dogmatism and nihilism must be rejected in the academic circle.

In China ,there indeed exists the practice of accepting or rejecting academic papers only according to the fame of the author ,and evaluating them only according to whether they are cited ,how often they are cited ,and whether excerpts or the whole papers are reprinted. Many scholarly journals such as university journals and evaluations of various ranks operate in this way.

Totally formalizing academic evaluation mechanism of this kind is not legitimate let alone reasonable. Sometimes the basis on which papers are accepted or rejected is itself neither legitimate nor reasonable because the person of some press digests who decides whether a particular paper is cited or reprinted or not is not necessarily academically cultivated himself. Sometimes the thing from which the evaluation mechanism gains academic legitimacy and reasonableness is itself not totally academic. As a matter of fact ,there are a great number of common works among the reprinted papers and excerpts.

The unreasonableness of formalizing academic evaluation mechanism also lies here: To evaluate the academic level of published papers on the frequency of their being cited is problematic. On the one hand ,the recognition of high level academic achievements is often delayed ,so citation cannot reflect the academic value of some papers in time. On the other hand ,at present the practice of plagiarism is prevalent: Often nearly the whole viewpoint and argumentation are copied from others ,but credit is not given to the original author. The number of this kind of “not being given credit to” is mind – staggering ,therefore the citation number collected by related institutions cannot reflect the actual situation of “being cited”.

What we should reject firmly is not rejecting academic commonplace ,nor necessary academic form ,but rather academic lords and totally formalized academic evaluation mechanism.

Li and Wu’s idea that academic research should not reject commonplace altogether and their argumentation are in fact advocating academic nihilism. From Gresham’s law ,the claim that academic research should not reject commonplace altogether equals ,in fact ,to the claim that academic research must reject innovation ,but academic research without innovation is obviously of no value and significance. Besides ,from their argumentation ,the claim that academic research should not reject commonplace altogether should be changed into “academic research must not reject commonplace”. The latter not only means bad money drives good money out of circulation ,but the bad one directly gets rid of the good one. Academic misconduct and the overflow of common academic research in present China are all due to bad academic

ecological environment. And academic lords and those who are satisfied with common academic research are conspirators of the formation of present bad academic ecological environment. Both the claim that academic research should not reject commonplace altogether and the claim that academic research must not reject commonplace are greatly harmful to academic research. We must object firmly to the academic nihilism that commonplace should not be rejected altogether.

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## The Oral Agreement of “Shelving Disputes” Is Breached by Japanese Government

The Japanese government confirmed on 26th March 2012 that the naming of the subsidiary islands of Diaoyu Islands ( Senkaku Islands called by the Japanese side) ,which are claimed as both states territories ,was certainly under the Japanese domestic legislation. For this reason ,the representative of Chinese Foreign Ministry has made an official declaration that China gets the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands and subsidiary islands which have been China’s inherent territories since the ancient time; therefore any unilateral behaviour made by Japanese government is illegal and invalid.

Japanese government’s naming of those controversial territories obviously breached the principle of Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes of International Law. This kind of behaviour is prohibited by the written rules under International Law. Therefore it is legally significant to prove the existence of this “shelving disputes” agreement between China and Japan; as a result this can prove that the Diaoyu Islands are not Japanese territories as claimed by the Japanese government and that the Japanese unilateral naming behaviour is illegal.

### **I . The “shelving disputes” agreement was made between Heads of Governments**

Deng Xiaoping ,who was then the Vice – Premier of China ,attended the exchange ceremony for instruments of ratification of the Sino – Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship which took place in Tokyo ,and met with Showa Emperor and the Japanese Prime – minister Takeo Fukuda on 23rd October 1978. He made a public speech to Japan’s National Press Club ( JN-PC) and answered questions asked by those JNPC reporters two days later.

Akinobu Kojima ,who was the vice – president of JNPL ,represented all reporters and questioned the territorial sovereignty concerning Senkaku